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System fluidity in English School Governance: Reflections on the implications 
for senior leaders of closed hierarchies 
 
Introduction 
This article draws on unfunded research in two contrasting local authorities (LAs) in an 
English Government region: a geographically large rural shire, and a more compact urban 
unitary authority. Both Councils were controlled overall by a single political party, albeit 
different ones. Both, as reflected in strategic documentation, faced similar challenges: 
significant demographic growth of young people, the need for economic development, new 
employment opportunities, skills development, new housing and new school places, not 
always in current geographical locations.  
 
Secondary academisation was largely complete in both authorities, but still developing at 
primary, reflecting the national position (DfE, 2017b). In the unitary, secondary provision 
was made largely by national or regional multi-academy trusts (MATs), but in the shire more 
secondaries remained stand-alone academies, or Single Academy Trusts (SATs) as they are 
now commonly referred to. Both demography and political histories in the contrasting LAs 
reflect Simkins’ et al’s (2014) distinction between historically interventionist and ‘hands off’ 
approaches to schools.  
 
The primary data came from semi-structured interviews with senior politicians from three 
political parties (Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Labour) to explore the arrangements 
for local democratic oversight of the areas they served in relation to what Greany and 
Higham (2017: 26) describe as the ‘hierarchical control’ (by central government) of all 
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schools, whether ‘maintained’ (by local authorities), free schools or academies (see below). 
Greany and Higham argue that this is a key aspect of the government’s policy aspiration for 
a ‘self-improving schools-led system’ (SISS). They claim that this aspiration is ‘largely 
undefined in official texts’ (p10), but aspects of it – for example, the need for ‘school leaders 
to lead improvement across the system’ – have featured in many documents, from the first 
white paper (policy document) of the Coalition Government (DfE, 2010: 18).   
 
Only the summary outcomes of these interviews are referred to here for reasons of space, 
but also because several interviewees agreed to be interviewed and recorded only on 
condition that no direct quotations would be sought. Gibton (2016) describes this perennial 
problem in interviewing senior policymakers, elected or appointed.  
 
The interviews took place within the rapidly changing context of national policy intentions 
and the aspirations of the two LAs expressed in their strategic documentation. Interviews 
were structured according to the outline of intended LA responsibilities, defined for the 
current conjuncture at least by the 2016 White Paper (DfE, 2016). More time was spent on 
school improvement and its significance for local school ecosystems, possibly because it was 
more controversial.  
 
The interviews were widened to include senior officers in both LAs, including chief officers. 
Because of the de facto concentration on school improvement, interviews were then held 
with senior postholders with responsibility for school improvement, though titled 
differently.  
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A later phase, still continuing, includes interviews with head teachers and chief executives 
(CEOs) of Multi-Academy Trusts (MATs), a Regional Schools Commissioner (RSC) arranged 
through the office of the National Schools Commissioner, an individual involved with a 
national charity promoting free schools, a former senior member of staff in central 
government roles, including at the Office of the Prime Minister, Number 10 Downing Street, 
and others. This later stage of the research is touched on here, but will be drawn on more 
extensively in later work. 
 
Policy background 
The movement away from LA ‘control’ of schools in England to what arguably is now a 
‘mixed economy’ of schools has been much studied at various stages of the process, for 
example: Academies Commission (2013), Boyask (2013), Coldron et al (2014), Cousin (2018), 
Greany (2014, 2015, 2018), Lord at al (2016), Riddell (2016), Simkins (2015), and many 
more.  Many earlier studies have been relatively small scale, comprising a few schools or 
handful of local authorities, but recently, the outcomes were published of a national 
Nuffield-funded project (Greany and Higham, 2018), using 47 school case studies across four 
localities, with a particular focus on the Self-Improving Schools System (SISS) and how 
stated policy aspirations have shaped and formed the current polity.  
 
Briefly, the ‘mixed economy’ comprises academies, which can be ‘sponsored’ (from 2003), 
and ‘convertors’ (from 2010), free schools, and (local authority-)‘maintained’ schools. There 
are faith schools in all categories. Academies are funded directly through an agreement with 
the Secretary of State, for which they are held accountable by the Education and Skills 
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Funding Agency, an ‘executive agency sponsored by the Department for Education’ 
(GOV.UK).  
 
Academies have increasingly joined Multi-Academy Trusts (MATs), not always consensually, 
that vary in size and reach from the very local to the national. MATs developed from 
informal and formal governance arrangements between schools (referred to as ‘soft’ and 
‘hard’ federations), then Trusts from 2006 Education Act. New proposals for single free-
standing academies (SATs) - commented on by Simkins (2015) as a feature of the (then) 
system - no longer receive approval, although this seems to be a recent development. MATs 
are companies registered at Companies House, with a small number of founding ‘members’ 
akin to shareholders in a private company who appoint the Board of Trustees. The Board 
then determines the governance relationships with individual schools, which may have local 
governing bodies with varying powers, or none (all DfE, 2017a).  
 
Free schools are formally academies as well, although ones that could be proposed (to the 
Secretary of State) by parents or other groups. In practice, proposing a free school is now 
the only way in law of opening a new school and such proposals are often made by MATs.   
 
Accompanying the declining statutory and other responsibilities of LAs have been strategic 
reductions in central government grant support (49.1% in real terms 2010-11 until 2017-18 
– NAO, 2018) and budget reductions due to ‘losing’ academies. New regional officials of 
central government were appointed from September 2014, known as Regional School 
Commissioners (RSCs), who are advised about the development of new MATs and academy 
conversions by headteacher boards (HTBs), three quarters of whom are elected from 
Page 5 of 26 
 
existing academy heads who are ‘well-positioned’ (Coldron et al, 2014). These RSCs were 
given new extensive powers, with growing staff complements to match, but 
announcements made by the Secretary of State (Hinds, 2018) will dramatically change the 
local balances of power.  
 
It is argued here that substantial changes such as those announced recently, made without 
the need for secondary legislation (for example, a Ministerial instruction) – because RSCs 
are directly appointed central government officials – could be followed similarly by more of 
a different nature. This makes it extremely difficult to be clear about national directions for 
school governance and organisation in the longer term, and the settled roles of RSCs, CEOs, 
headteachers, recently constituted Sub-Regional School Improvement Boards and LAs more 
widely. This policy ‘assemblage’ (Ball and Junemann, 2012: 138) appears to be 
(permanently) unstable, as Greany and Higham (2018) also observe, with shifting degrees of 
‘steering and rowing’ (Ball and Junemann, ibid: 141). This fluidity not only generates 
uncertainty, but makes it difficult to achieve the objective distance required for 
authoritative academic comment. 
 
Primary data gathering  
Arguably, many studies of the developing English ‘system’ (to use the contested term) of 
schooling examined aspects of the implementation of policy and policy narratives: how had 
it gone? what are its effects, intended and unintended? what is the emerging shape of the 
system? Less frequently examined are the current nature of democratic oversight of state 
schooling in England (and by whom), and how parents and wider communities can be 
involved in their children’s schooling. 
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Thus, semi-structured interviews were sought in both Councils with the Leader of the 
Council (however defined), the Cabinet member for Education (similar), and the Chair of 
Scrutiny. In one council, the party of the Cabinet member changed due to a reshuffle and so 
two interviews were held. All requests were agreed, though it did not prove possible to 
arrange a timely meeting with one of the Leaders. All interviews were recorded, though 
without transcripts because of the confidentiality matters explained above. Questioning 
covered the following broad areas: 
 
1) Perceptions of the role of the council in relation to schooling, the nature and extent of 
the council’s democratic mandate and the contribution of schools to their strategic 
priorities. 
2) How the Council made decisions: which in open forum with the possibility of questioning 
by members of the public, and which in private. In addition, which matters went to 
Scrutiny, how these were selected, and whether they considered scrutiny and the 
involvement of wider stakeholders effective. 
3) Perceptions of the exercise of the Council’s three major responsibilities as above: 
providing sufficient school places of good quality (defined by Ofsted inspection criteria), 
ensuring the needs of vulnerable children are met, and championing parents and 
families (DfE, 2016: 70). In practice, all three responsibilities involved some measure of 
attainment and student progression monitoring, and hence involved school 
improvement functions and how school quality was considered relevant to the Council’s 
broader aspirations. This aspect then turned into a lengthier discussion, despite the 
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Government’s original intention that LAs would cease school improvement work by 
2017 (2016, Ibid). 
 
Interviews with senior officers broadly complemented the above and sought perceptions of 
the Council’s work in the same areas and the contributions made by staff. Councillors and 
officers provided copies of relevant documents that could not be found on websites, of 
which there were a considerable number. Later comments of heads and others referred to 
above are drawn on where available and relevant to the discussion, although their focus 
was slightly different. 
 
Summary outcomes 
The summary outcomes reported here are grouped under the three headings outlined 
above and draw on interview data, together with local and national documentation. All 
interviews with elected politicians were conducted before the significant announcement 
made by the new Secretary of State (Hinds, 2018).  
 
1) There was broad agreement about the nature and extent of the council’s democratic 
mandate and the potential contribution of schools to strategic priorities. For example, in 
the unitary LA, the development of new industrial sectors (media, creative and digital) 
was creating new and different demands for skills according to the Council and its 
partners, identifying a need for more investment pre- and post-16. In both LAs, 
population growth, plus in the shire, the relocation of armed service personnel, was 
generating a demand for more school places. Similarly, a growth in SEND referrals (of 
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children with Special Educational Needs or Disabilities) was creating substantial need for 
new places in both mainstream and specialist provision. 
  
Building new schools and creating new school places has never depended on just the LA: 
besides their own decision-making processes, which can be lengthy, it has depended on 
a statutory process and external approval for substantial change – either ministerial or 
through School Organisation Committees – and the ability to fund any capital works 
involved. These have varied with national circumstance and political control, but the 
requirement to run ‘competitions’ for new schools, which since 2010 have had to be 
free schools, has led to processes described by politicians, officers and CEOs as ‘chaotic’ 
at best. The decision to open a new free school is one for the Secretary of State, advised 
by the RSC.  
 
The ‘sponsorship’ for such a new free school is now sought from an ‘approved’ MAT 
which is generally seen as likely to provide and sustain ‘good’ school places. The forecast 
for new school places required however comes from the LA, but the capital allocated 
from a national DfE Team. Local MATs in an area can agree between them which will bid 
to open a new school on a quasi-cartel basis and in the unitary they had asked the LA to 
run a competition for new secondary schools. But it is open for a different MAT 
altogether – with a head office out of the area - to make a bid direct to the RSC (from 
‘left field’ as one officer descried it). This had occurred in the unitary.   
 
The further complication for new (free) schools is that a separate national DfE-owned 
property company (see www.LocatEd.co.uk) is responsible for finding possible sites, 
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consistent with local planning restrictions and other needs such as finding land for new 
housing, within the time scale required for children who are actually born and getting 
older. Not surprisingly, in both LAs, substantial delays were reported and in one of them, 
discussion had taken place of the conversion of a former fire station for a new special 
school. In the other, the LA had reluctantly taken the decision to expand its special 
school places by consulting on the closure of existing maintained schools, a process that 
still required a lengthy statutory process, and proposing a new academy on an identified 
site.  Although they regarded this as necessary, it was a complex and unpredictable 
process, and much contested. 
 
In the absence of new school places, in existing schools or otherwise, the LAs have no 
power to compel existing academies or free schools to increase their intake even 
marginally. The opposite is the case for maintained schools, but overall this can 
reportedly leave children without local accessible school places precisely when they are 
needed. In one case a newly-appointed headteacher was unable to move to a new 
school at all. 
 
2) All interviewed in the LAs, with officers’ and politicians’ views mirroring each other, 
made the case for the Council being the only body that could understand local needs 
and claim legitimate oversight of all the services in their communities. In one LA, this 
was expressed in explicit moral terms, reflecting Council literature. In the other, it was 
similarly claimed that the Council was the only organisation that could legitimately 
represent residents.  
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The nature and levels of openness of each Council’s decision making was thus presented 
as vital. There are few open, publicly accessible, routine meetings of any committees 
any more (with some exceptions) with the notable exception of the two Cabinets. Both 
Cabinets were entirely composed of members of the majority group on the Council. 
Strategic or publicly important decisions about Education were brought to Cabinet by 
the Cabinet member for Education. She would explain in public what they were minded 
to decide, supported by a senior officer; sometimes the Cabinet would vote on the 
matter. Papers for meetings are published on the Councils’ websites well in advance, 
according to statutory requirements, and members of the public are allowed to ask 
(previously notified) questions. In practice, members of the public are also allowed to 
address Cabinet in both Councils, as was explained. 
 
Both Cabinets could refer major decisions to a full meeting of Council, with similar 
requirements for public access and address. Certain statutory matters can only be 
discussed in Council, for example, setting the annual budget and the level of the Council 
Tax. 
 
Contrast with this with decision making by the RSC, who reports to the National Schools 
Commissioner (NSC), an official who is in turn directly accountable to the Secretary of 
State. This ministerial postholder is elected as an MP, but appointed by the Prime 
Minister and accountable to Parliament. In practice, RSCs and the NSC have since their 
inception been overseen by an appointed and unelected member of the House of Lords.  
RSCs make decisions, on the advice given by the HTB, affecting individual schools, 
groups of schools or MATs which are only then made public. Neither the agendas nor 
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the papers (reportedly because of commercial confidence) for HTB meetings have been 
published historically at all. Summary minutes of the monthly meetings have been 
published in a timely way only recently, though the current interim National Schools 
Commissioner has stated publicly he wishes to change this. This reportedly often leaves 
councillors, officials, headteachers, governors, MAT CEOs and their Boards unaware of 
when and why decisions are made. The latter three have a DfE official assigned to them 
to advise on new school proposals they have made. This official is supposed to inform 
them when decisions will be made and what was decided, but not on how discussion 
went and why.  
 
At individual academy level, or MATs as a whole, decisions about staffing structures – 
and sometimes the futures of individual leaders – are made at a Board or executive 
level, then communicated, sometimes indifferently and without any local input to a MAT 
whose HQ may be in a neighbouring town or ‘hundreds of miles away’ (LA officer). One 
example encountered was where, following a disagreement with a MAT Board, the 
original members of the MAT had met in private session and decided to dismiss an 
academy’s entire local governing body, as they were entitled to do (DfE, 2017a). The 
academy’s staff were told of this decision at a morning briefing by the CEO with the 
headteacher present, who then informed the chair of governors who did not yet know.   
 
Individual academies within a MAT reportedly have virtually no relation with the RSC. 
The RSC relates only at MAT level: although there is a reported annual ‘health check’ on 
a school’s data (including Ofsted data) undertaken by an RSC officer (and both the LAs 
visited), any immediate concerns from the RSC are taken up directly with the MAT, 
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usually via the CEO. There appears to be a developing pattern whereby the RSC will hold 
an arguably ‘challenging’ annual meeting with the Chair of the Board, who will also often 
be a founding ‘member’, and the CEO. Ofsted do ‘focused’ inspections of schools, in the 
absence of a statutory right to inspect the MAT itself, and in one of the LAs visited, this 
had led to the rebrokering of a MAT by the RSC. There are plans currently for Ofsted to 
‘evaluate’ MATs though these were not published at the time of writing. However, the 
headteacher of an individual school often has little say or involvement in any of these 
sorts of decision, including about their own futures. One, reflecting speculation about 
whether headship ‘autonomy’ may become a thing of the past (Lord et al, 2016; Greany 
and Earley, 2018), expressed her isolation and dismay at her lack of involvement in (her 
own) annual appraisal process. Much of the everyday language in MATs noted in this 
research was of ‘holding to account’, ‘what are you going to do (about this)’; rarely 
‘what support do you need’. No doubt this will provide a future object of profitable 
study for critical discourse analysis.  
 
Lastly, on openness, the scrutiny processes of local authorities need noting. Originally 
set up in the wake of the abolition of former committees, Scrutiny Commissions, as they 
are termed, have the power to scrutinise or ‘call in’ not only decisions and processes of 
their Council, but of all those of organisations in the area served by the Council. The 
scrutiny process was being reviewed in both LAs visited, but there were common 
features, including being chaired by a member of the opposition party, being routinely 
consulted directly by the Cabinet member, and agreeing an annual programme of work, 
especially where the Council was undertaking a major review (eg the expansion of 
special school provision, or closure of children’s centres). Headteachers and other 
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stakeholders attended both commissions and often a controversial report would receive 
extensive public local media airing (for example, a report critical of school admissions 
processes for secondary academies). In this sense, they may resemble the functions of 
House of Commons Select Committees (see 
https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/committees/select/), and neither have the 
power to compel change from their respective executives. Nevertheless, all Cabinet 
members interviewed felt they were directly responsible to the communities their 
Councils served and that they needed to make an adequate and justifiable response to 
criticisms and the views of stakeholders. 
 
3) All interviewees questioned about the implementation of the three major LA 
responsibilities in the 2016 White Paper (DfE, 2016) rehearsed the implications of the 
budget reductions outlined earlier; all referred to the increased demands for children’s 
services and elderly social care; all knew of the reported forthcoming crisis in at least 
one council nationally against annual assessments of council financial sustainability 
(NAO, 2018). All explained current officer restructurings in their Council as being related 
to the difficulties of ‘focusing on the right things’. Officers in particular explained that 
they either had no one to undertake particular responsibilities, or the ones that they had 
were sometimes overwhelmed, while statutory responsibilities had not diminished. One 
Cabinet member explained how consequently they had worked on developing a culture 
in their Council where all officers and politicians, irrespective of responsibilities (eg in 
Finance or Personnel), were able to contribute to championing vulnerable children, 
families and communities and enacting the corporate parent. Time and further research 
will tell whether such efforts are successful or not. 
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The difficulties in current arrangements of securing the provision of sufficient good 
school places, particularly in the context of demographic growth and change have been 
outlined, particularly where this involves developing new schools or expanding existing 
ones. 
 
Developing new ‘good’ school places, however, implies much more than just 
commissioning them from the private companies that are MATs, irrespective of their 
willingness to provide them. The schools involved may have uneven trajectories and 
years of poorer outcome data or weak inspections. So the annual LA health check on 
data is sent to all schools, irrespective of status; where there are ‘concerns’, however 
defined, contact is made with senior leaders. Both LAs expressed the willingness of 
maintained schools (and MATs) to respond to such approaches, both offered support 
(often from an existing senior leader) and access to other programmes, with variable 
charges depending on status. This was more problematic for secondary schools because 
of reported LA capacity problems. 
 
But where academies (or MATs – both LAs have had recent negative experiences in this 
regard) did not wish to engage with LA concerns, officers and politicians both expressed 
their complete lack of power to challenge the schools effectively. In one LA, politicians 
of the same political party as the government expressed ‘utter’ frustration with the 
system as it now is, pointing out their worst performing schools were academies but 
they could do nothing save refer it to the RSC, who would then refer to the MAT, 
sometimes using their own ‘Education Advisers’ to undertake a investigation parallel to 
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both that of the LA and Ofsted. These senior politicians described how they had 
repeatedly raised these concerns about an overly complex system that just did not work 
in national party political gatherings, without receiving any response. 
 
Partly as a response to these quality matters, but also because of the need to expand 
school places in the right locations and the wish to engage all state schools at early 
stages of setting the strategic objectives for local visions, both LAs had developed LA-
wide partnership arrangements in which academies, free and maintained schools were 
represented and, crucially, the MAT CEOs, even where regional or national.  
 
Both LAs were in the process of refining the terms of reference for School Groups – 
partnerships in new formulation such as those considered by Hatcher (2014) – that 
develop collective responses to the ‘development, support and challenge’ of all schools 
as one put it. The desire was to move from mere ‘talking shops’, as one secondary head 
described it, to bodies that actively engaged in more collective responsibility for 
monitoring and improving outcomes for all young people in their areas - something both 
Councils, controlled by different political parties, felt was part of their core purpose. 
 
The apparent and reported development from the earlier non-engagement of MATs to 
the active enrolment of all those represented in an area represented a significant 
development in both areas. More significantly still, both LAs reported that the RSC saw 
these bodies as crucial to ‘holding to account’ MAT CEOs – something also considered 
absent before.  
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This, if it develops positively, may prove to be a developing national pattern. One 
apparent driver, unlike in the partnerships described by Hatcher, was the very recent 
announcements made by the Secretary of State (Hinds, 2018). These, in response he 
said, to widespread concerns expressed by all parties about unclear systems and parallel 
inspection and data systems, was the need to set out a ‘vision for a clearer school 
system’ (Ibid). The immediate implications – because of the centralised nature of the 
state referred to - seemed to be for RSCs and their staff. They could no longer employ 
their ‘Education Advisers’ to give an unpublished assessment of academy outcomes or 
MAT’s quality – including leadership – ‘parallel’ to Ofsted and there were to be no more 
compulsory academisations of ‘coasting’ schools. RSCs were to work more closely with 
LAs (though many had been doing so), and their endorsement of these local school 
partnerships could potentially represent significant changes to the local governance 
structure round schools. 
 
DfE officials had recently been conducting their own research into how LAs conducted 
their school improvement responsibilities (one LA had been involved) saying there was 
to be a ‘ministerial briefing paper’. It has now apparently been announced to LAs (not 
publicly) that there would be consultation paper on the role of LAs to be issued in 
Autumn 2018 – this had not yet emerged at the time of writing. Chief officers also 
reported that they had been told that there had been a draft paper on the roles of LAs 
before the 2017 election that never emerged either because of lack of ministerial sign 
off. This paper would presumably have not included much on LA school improvement 
functions but its successor might.  
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Since these discussions, further documentation has emerged that provides further 
clarity on the changing governance arrangements in which schools work. One of the 
regional teams of the Teaching Schools Council has issued a document outlining a 
‘regional operating framework for school improvement’ (TSC, 2018). Although an older 
reform, Teaching Schools were intended to be a central part of the development of the 
SISS (Self-Improving Schools system) as Greany and Higham (2018) point out. Their role 
was to help develop school based programmes of initial teacher education and 
coordinate the deployment of school leaders to support schools with training or 
development needs, especially after unsatisfactory inspections or being deemed ‘at risk’ 
through the annual data health checks of LAs or the RSC. The coverage of Teaching 
Schools is uneven nationally, however, as Greany and Higham point out and Greany 
(2018) further points out that the development work they enable is often ‘upstream’ of 
a serious problem being identified in a school.  
 
Nevertheless, there are two significant aspects of this document. The first is an early 
statement (p2) that ‘much of the school improvement work in academies, previously led 
by the RSC’s office, has ended or has been scaled back’, demonstrating the impact of 
Hind (0218). The second is that, as part of the renaming of the Sub Regional School 
Improvement Boards, set up to oversee the former School Standards Improvement Fund 
that has now closed to new bids according to three interviewees, a significant role was 
envisaged for the Local Schools Standards Boards - at LA level. The partnership 
arrangements developing in both the LAs studied could well fulfil this role.  
 
Discussion  
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Arguably, the two most significant findings emerging from the research summarised in 
this paper are first the re-emergence of local authorities in the local governance 
arrangements for all schools, maintained and academies, and second the diminished 
powers and capacity of the Regional Schools Commissioners (RSCs).  
 
On the first, the arrangements emerging in the two LAs studied are as yet in formation. 
If they are more widely replicated, then this could represent a strategic attempt to 
include MAT CEOs, or their representatives, in accountability structures in which DfE 
officials will also be represented. It is not clear what this might mean for MAT CEOs, or 
the ‘evaluations’ promised by Ofsted, but it might mean a more open discussion – albeit 
still behind closed doors - on performance and role. In the urban unitary, an existing 
partnership arrangement already involves MATs and discussions take place there on the 
broader strategic issues faced in the LA’s area, as detailed above. In the shire, possibly 
because of the greater geographical area covered, this is intended though slower in 
coming to fruition. It is certainly the case that MAT CEOs interviewed to date recognise 
that the schools they oversee are embedded in the wider social and economic context 
being considered by their respective councils. 
 
This is not quite the same function as the Local Schools Standards Boards described by 
the Teaching Schools Council document, however, which is intended to have oversight 
of local data, schools potentially at risk and the support and development arrangements 
that might be put in place for them, or ‘brokered’. Work of this latter sort is taking place 
in both these LAs, including on data sharing protocols. Moving from ‘talking shops’ as 
one headteacher put it, however, has not been achieved and a lot of very detailed 
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discussion is involved. However, although the politicians interviewed in both LAs were 
pleased that these partnerships were beginning to do their work, after various attempts 
to engage, they had no direct input to either – reflecting Hatcher’s earlier charge of 
‘managerialism’. 
 
And although there is involvement of MATs (and officials) in both these functions, there 
is no local forum where broader issues of policy or direction – such as the promotion of 
all-through schools, the nature of alternative provision or the specialist sector – can be 
discussed alongside, perhaps, the limitations of capacity at national and local levels 
because of budget restraint. The RSC interviewed made very clear that this was so and 
that decisions such as the above would be made generally on a case by case basis, 
sometimes including MATs, sometimes including LA politicians and officers, and 
sometimes just individual schools. This does not mean that these discussions could not 
take place in the future, and this was beginning in the urban unitary, but it does 
represent the ‘depolitisation’ referred to by Wilkins (2017) and others. 
 
What may seem as managerialism by some can be seen as professionalism (and 
welcomed) by others: these arrangements do represent (largely) senior professionals 
having oversight of the development of and support for state schooling, but that also 
represents a ‘depoliticised’ acceptance of the main purpose of state schooling being to 
raise attainment outcomes and, possibly more broadly, progression and social mobility. 
 
But not all senior professionals are present in these arrangements. As suggested above, 
Lord et al (2016) are among several that suggest the more traditional autonomy of the 
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head teacher or senior leader in a state school may be becoming rarer, with relations of 
academies with DfE officials being conducted through the CEO and Chair of the Board, as 
was found here. The accountability (DfE, 2017a) of the head teacher in a MAT is to the 
CEO and the Board and sometimes, as found here, not even complicated by a local 
governing body that includes representatives of parents and the local community. The 
effect of another school visited as part of this research of receiving an ‘inadequate’ 
inspection verdict, for example, was the immediate abolition of its governing body by 
the MAT asked to take over its governance by the RSC. And the comments of Coldron et 
al (2014) are relevant here: it is the well-positioned head teachers that are most 
prominent and active in these arrangements, reflecting the emerging ‘hierarchies’ 
identified by Greany and Higham (2018). 
 
The results of the second finding to emerge, however, the diminished power and 
capacity of the RSCs, are more difficult to interpret. They are set within a much broader 
reported picture of diminished capacity of all government departments – one senior 
officer explained ‘there is just no one at the DfE to talk to’ – as a result of budget 
restraint there too and, as reported at least by politicians of the same party of the 
current UK government, the preparations for Brexit. But it appears that the previously 
seen large numbers of compulsory conversions to academy status and MAT expansion 
are at least past their peak, possibly for the foreseeable future. 
 
These changes do not require primary legislation (passed by Parliament) of any sort, and 
so could well be altered quickly in the future, with further implications for the changing 
work and power relationships for all significant local actors in state schooling. At the risk 
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of being sententious, fluidity in school governance is likely to be the steady state for 
some time – this is one of Ball and Junemann’s (2012) ‘unstable assemblages’. Further, 
even when arrangements are set out clearly, for example in new secondary legislation, 
then their implications locally will also vary with the numerical balance of maintained 
schools and academies; the local presence of MATs and their governance arrangements, 
ambitions and structures (which vary widely nationally, as Greany and Higham identify); 
the choices of role made by the LA; and, of course, the number of schools being 
identified at risk by current and future national criteria.  
 
Structures are important for professional relationships, not least because they may be 
constraining or empowering, but how they are enacted locally will also depend (Ball et 
al, 2012) on the way senior leaders conduct themselves and the moral purpose and 
drive they bring to their respective roles in schools, LAs, MATs and as officials. But how 
they are experienced in schools will also depend on the latest iterations of the ‘highly 
centralised state’, as one ex-senior official expressed it, and Grany and Higham (2018) 
found, albeit one that is also ‘chaotic’. RSCs have been part of this previously, but Ofsted 
still remains. The results of the annual data health check by LAs and RSCs, together with 
changing expectations from Ofsted with successive inspection frameworks, even as 
accepted comparative measures change, will continue to create its own annual focus on 
outcomes for all schools, even well-positioned ones, with the tensions that this brings 
for staff. In this sense, it is perhaps not surprising that Greany and Higham found that 
fewer than half of school leaders support the trajectory of current English policy while 
being positive about their own schools. 
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Conclusions 
  
As Gunter (2012) argued, the expectations and structure of national education reform 
frame and position school leaders’ work. For some, where those who not well-positioned 
in the current contexts of outcome and inspection data, demographic change or school 
reorganisation, these changes may affect the nature or source of future support or 
intervention. They will be affected also by the fluidity of the changing governance 
arrangements, including the nature of the MAT they might belong to. So they may be 
involved to a greater or less extent when there are problems. Choosing where to work, in 
academies or maintained schools, well-positioned or otherwise within the local 
hierarchies, and their concomitant openness, may be important. But this has always been 
the case arguably – local authorities have never been uniform in the ways they work any 
more than the communities they serve. Wherever school leaders do work, however, the 
fluidity of the current arrangements and shifting organisational arrangements may in any 
case alter their local context over time. 
 
And although the permanent readiness for Ofsted described by some interviewees for 
this research must certainly structure much leaders’ work, it is worth bearing in mind 
that 86% of schools inspected in the most recently reported round achieved a ‘good’ or 
better grade (Ofsted, 2018). Although the vigilance described may be appropriate, it is a 
small minority of schools that will experience a ‘full’ inspection with its implications for 
detailed and accountable action planning undertaken in the public glare.  
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Councils more widely – politicians and their appointed officers - may well feel 
optimistically they have authority to develop a local vision for all the communities that 
elected them, and the developing new arrangements give them a recognised role in the 
oversight of all schools in their areas. With their reported lack of capacity following 
budget reductions, however, and now apparently that of the RSCs, the ability of all to 
undertake development work appears diminished, especially at secondary level. For 
MATs, there is also now an increasingly recognised role in local governance 
arrangements, including their contributions to the broader challenges Council areas face. 
But there remain two undiscussed issues concerning the routine involvement of parents 
and local communities in the development of state schooling and the as yet lack of any 
forum of any sort to routinely discuss local policy directions and choices. The Teaching 
Schools Council document, while setting out clearly several layers of authority, only deals 
with school improvement work.  
 
For DfE officials and the agencies through which they work, their activities in relation to 
local schooling may be more restricted now, but this also reflects the same generic 
capacity problems as their local authority colleagues. And of course this may change 
again in the fullness of time, including after a change of minister or government. The 
longer term outlook is unstable. 
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